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Abstract
■ The medial pFC (mPFC) is frequently reported to play a cen-
tral role in Theory of Mind (ToM). However, the contribution of
this large cortical region in ToM is not well understood. Combin-
ing a novel behavioral task with fMRI, we sought to demonstrate
functional divisions between dorsal and rostral mPFC. All con-
ditions of the task required the representation of mental states
(beliefs and desires). The level of demands on cognitive control
(high vs. low) and the nature of the demands on reasoning
(deductive vs. abductive) were varied orthogonally between con-
ditions. Activation in dorsal mPFC was modulated by the need
for control, whereas rostral mPFC was modulated by reasoning
demands. These findings fit with previously suggested domain-
general functions for different parts of mPFC and suggest that
these functions are recruited selectively in the service of ToM. ■
INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a term used to describe the
ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires,
and intentions to other individuals. By applying a ToM,
social agents are better able to predict the behavior of
those around them and may additionally direct our own
behavior in terms of whether we choose to deceive, coop-
erate, or empathize with others (Gallagher & Frith, 2003).
This ability to “mentalize” has received much attention
from the neuroimaging community over the last decade
and has identified a set of brain regions that are consis-
tently responsive when thinking about the contents of
other peopleʼs minds: the left and right TPJ, medial parie-
tal cortices including the precuneus and posterior cin-
gulate, the temporal poles, and the medial pFC (mPFC;
for reviews, see Mar, 2011; Carrington & Bailey, 2009;
Van Overwalle, 2009; Lieberman, 2007). The most promi-
nent debate within the literature, however, surrounds how
medial prefrontal and temporoparietal regions support a
functioning ToM.
One challenge for social neuroscientists is to localize
ToM processes more precisely by identifying functional
subdivisions within the anatomical regions associated with
ToM. mPFC, in particular, comprises a large area of the
cortex and is involved in many aspects of social cognition
(Amodio & Frith, 2006), together with an array of executive
processes such as reallocation of attention, action moni-
toring and control (Lieberman, 2007; Rushworth, Buckley,
Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007; Ramnani & Owen,
2004), relational integration andmultitasking (Gilbert et al.,
2006; Ramnani & Owen, 2004), outcome monitoring
(Gilbert et al., 2006), working memory and episodic mem-
ory (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Gilbert
et al., 2006; Ramnani & Owen, 2004) and default mode
or spontaneous “at rest” cognition (Spreng et al., 2009;
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Ramnani & Owen, 2004). Because
ToM is a social process but undoubtedly also entails exec-
utive processing, attention, and reasoning (Apperly, 2010),
it is perhaps unsurprising that the role of mPFC in ToM
remains unclear (Rothmayr et al., 2011).
It is likely that activation of mPFC, in some ToM tasks,
reflects executive processes that are an incidental fea-
ture of the task used to present the ToM problem. Thus
these do not constitute core processes that underlie ToM.
Nonetheless, there are also good reasons for believing that
specific subregions of mPFC are more centrally involved
in ToM. A task analysis of ToM suggests three processes
that may explain how specific regions of mPFC are
involved in mentalizing. First, a common theme across all
forms of ToM reasoning is the requirement for representa-
tion of a mental state. Thus, regardless of whether an indi-
vidual is asked to reason about an agentʼs belief, desire,
intention, or the like, it is necessary to represent a mental
state of some kind. The frequency with which more rostral
areas of mPFC are recruited for ToM and other social cog-
nitive functions has led researchers to tentatively suggest
that mPFC might subserve such a process (Amodio &
Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003, 2006). Other data suggest
that TPJ may be even more selectively responsive than
mPFC to representation of mental states (Aichhorn et al.,
2009; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, &University of Birmingham, UK
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Saxe, 2009; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).
Resolutionof this debate is unnecessary for our current pur-
poses. What matters for now is that there are grounds to
suppose that mPFC may be involved in representation of
mental states and that it is possible to distinguish this
representational requirement, which attends all ToM
tasks, fromother important requirements for cognitive con-
trol and reasoning, which vary across ToM tasks or
experimental conditions.
Second, a large body of behavioral and neural evidence
indicates that ToM is associated with processes for cog-
nitive control (e.g., Apperly, 2010; Lieberman, 2007). Con-
trol processes for inhibition, conflict monitoring, and
working memory are not only necessary for meeting the
demands of the relatively complex stories or cartoons fre-
quently used to study ToM but also seem to be essential
for ToM per se. For example, in the classic false belief
paradigm (see Wimmer & Perner, 1983), an agent holds
an outdated or “false” belief about reality. Predicting the
agentʼs action requires participants first to infer that the
agentʼs belief is different from their own, second to hold
this false belief in mind and not confuse it with their
own knowledge, and third to predict the agentʼs action
selectively on the basis of the agentʼs belief, rather than
according to the participantʼs own knowledge of the right
course of action. Behavioral data from both children and
adults suggest that the effort required for ToM reason-
ing (as indexed by response times and error rates) de-
pends on whether an agentʼs belief is true or false and
whether their desire is to approach or avoid a target object
(Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen, 2012; Apperly, Warren,
Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011; German & Hehman,
2006). Attempts to understand the neural basis of such
effort consistently identify more dorsal regions of mPFC
(dmPFC) approximating BA 8, BA 9, and BA 32. For exam-
ple, dmPFC is modulated by contrasting ToM concepts
where maximal conflict exists, as is the case in false belief
reasoning versus reasoning about an agent whose belief
is a “true” representation of reality (Döhnel et al., 2012;
Hartwright et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2007).
Importantly, recent evidence suggests that the con-
tribution of frontal regions does not just vary according
to overall task difficulty, but according to the source of that
difficulty in the ToM task. In a recent study on which the
present paradigm is based, participants predicted the
action of an agent whose belief was either true or false
and whose desire was either to approach or avoid an object
(Hartwright et al., 2012). Both factors have the potential
to vary cognitive conflict, because both false belief and
avoidance desire lead the agent into counterintuitive
actions away from a salient target object. However, only
the belief factor (true vs. false) leads to systematic variation
in perspective between the character and the participant.
In this study, dmPFC was modulated equally by the belief
and desire factors, suggesting that it was performing a gen-
eral role in resolving cognitive conflict. This contrasted
with more lateral prefrontal regions, such as bilateral infer-
ior frontal gyrus, which responded differentially to true
versus false belief, but not to approach versus avoidance
desire. These findings suggest that dmPFC underlies front-
line control processes, which monitor conflict during ToM
reasoning, whereas frontolateral regions, such as inferior
frontal gyrus, are recruited for more specific processes such
as inhibition of self-perspective. This theory about the con-
tribution of dmPFC converges with neuroimaging research
outside the social domain, which identifies mPFC, par-
ticularly more dorsal regions including the dorsal ACC, in
conflict monitoring and error detection. It has been shown
that activation in dmPFC is modulated by task difficulty,
where those tasks that attract increased error rates and
response latencies make the most demands on this region
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Bush, Luu, & Posner,
2000; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999).
The final process we propose within our task analysis
of ToM is the focus of the current study and refers to the
different roles of reasoning. Philosophers, logicians, and
computational scientists have long debated the formula-
tion of reasoning. These debates are beyond the scope of
the present article; however, we borrow two theoretical
concepts to illustrate how different approaches to ToM
can activate alternative modes of inference and their neu-
ral correlates. In the belief desire task used by Hartwright
et al. (2012), participants were told three facts for each
trial: the agentʼs belief about the location of an object,
the agentʼs desire to seek out or avoid the object, and
the true location of the object. Given this information, par-
ticipants had to identify which location the agent would
choose on the basis of his belief and desire state. Thus,
participants had to reason “deductively,” so no reason-
ing beyond the facts explicitly presented was required
(Pagnucco, 1996; Morris, 1992). Unlike the vast majority
of neuroimaging studies of ToM, activation within rostral
mPFC (rmPFC), approximating BA10, was noticeably
absent from this deductive ToM paradigm.
However, many ToM studies—and certainly a good deal
of ToM outside the laboratory—do not provide explicit
access to all of the facts necessary to solve the task (Jenkins
& Mitchell, 2009). Consequently, the individual is required
to engage in open-ended “abductive” reasoning about
an agentʼs behavior to use their ToM effectively. Con-
sider a typical ToM vignette taken from Saxe and Andrews-
Hanna (n.d.),
The morning of the high school disco Sarah placed
her high heel shoes under her dress and then went
shopping. That afternoon, her sister borrowed the
shoes and later put them under Sarahʼs bed.
-
Sarah gets ready assuming her shoes are under her
dress.
TRUE/FALSE
Unlike the deductive approach, reasoning here is used to
explain an observation on the basis of a hypothesis,
which may or may not turn out to be correct. Here,
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participants are required to reason abductively—that is,
to infer the most likely cause (Sarahʼs belief that her
shoes are under her dress) on the basis of the given
effect (that Sarah gets ready unaware that her shoes might
not be where she expects to find them) and a ToM prin-
ciple (that Sarah will look for the shoes on the basis of
her belief state). Here, then, reasoning is an inference to
the most appropriate explanation (Menzies, 1996). Rea-
soning deductively, where one uses a set of rules and
preconditions to generate a conclusion (Menzies, 1996),
is likely to involve cognitive process that differ from an
abductive approach involving reasoning to explain an
observation (Morris, 1992). While the neural basis of
deductive reasoning has been studied extensively (see
Prado, Chadha, & Booth, 2011, for a recent review), little
work has been done for abductive inference. Nonetheless,
when considered in terms of the underlying process of
thinking beyond the given information, studies indicate
that rmPFC is recruited when participants are required to
reason beyond the constraints of the information imme-
diately available to them (Hartwright et al., 2012; Jenkins
& Mitchell, 2009; Gilbert et al., 2007), whether the context
is social or nonsocial. This leads to the hypothesis that,
rather than being involved in representing mental states,
rmPFC is recruited whenever ToM tasks require abductive
reasoning. This would account for the frequent observation
of rmPFC activation because abductive reasoning is very
common in ToM tasks.
However, there is an alternative explanation for the
lack of variable mPFC activation in Hartwright et al.
(2012) that remains consistent with the hypothesis that
rmPFC supports the representational demands of ToM,
as touched upon earlier in our task analysis. The need to
represent mental states was present across all conditions
in Hartwright et al.ʼs deductive task; consequently, rmPFC
might not be identified by orthogonal comparisons across
conditions if this region generally services the process of
representation. Therefore, this study manipulates the need
for abductive reasoning within task to disambiguate these
two possibilities.
In summary, there are multiple theoretical reasons for
thinking that mPFC might be involved in ToM and several
competing hypotheses designed to account for this. Fur-
thermore, there are grounds for thinking that there might
actually be functional differentiation within mPFC, which
a number of researchers have suggested would be best
identified using a single, within-experiment, within-subject
design (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Carrington &
Bailey, 2009). The task analysis presented here proposes
three separate processes for ToM: representation, control,
and reasoning. Representation, we argue, is a ubiquitous
feature of mentalizing. Control and reasoning processes,
conversely, vary across different ToM tasks. The latter
two ToM processes lend themselves well to manipulation
within a single, repeated-measures paradigm. Conse-
quently, this study served two purposes. First, to replicate
Hartwright et al.ʼs earlier finding that dmPFC is modulated
as a function of control. Second, by making a minimal
change to our previous paradigm, we aimed to demon-
strate that we could recruit the previously absent rmPFC
by including a condition that required abductive reason-
ing. To achieve this, we present a 2 × 3 repeated-measures
orthogonal design. The valence of an agentʼs belief was
either true or false; the valence of desire was either
approach or avoidance (as in Hartwright et al., 2012) or it
was unspecified. The novel, unspecified, condition re-
quired participants to reason about whether they thought
the agent would have an approach or an avoidance desire,
on the basis of what sort of person they thought the agent
was. We expected those mental states where conflict is
inherent but presented unambiguously in our paradigm
(i.e., false belief, avoidance desire), to preferentially re-
cruit dmPFC. Conversely, a mental state that required
abductive reasoning (i.e., desire unspecified) was expected
to preferentially activate rmPFC.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty right-handed adults participated in the fMRI experi-
ments (12 women; mean age = 21 years). All were native
English speakers and were given a small honorarium for
their participation. The study had research ethics approval
from the University of Birmingham. All participants gave
written consent to participate in the study.
Prescreen
A prescreen to determine suitability to participate was
conducted several days before collecting any neuroimaging
data. This consisted of a handedness measure, using a mod-
ified form of the Annett Handedness Questionnaire (1970),
and a reading scale—the Wide Range Achievement Test
Third Edition—to ensure reading proficiency commen-
surate with the experimental tasks.
Participants were informed that the social judgments
task required them to make predictions about how real
individuals played a game in a previous experiment. They
then completed a computer-based interactive training
session and two test blocks of the task. Those who per-
formed above chance on the test blocks were invited to
participate in the fMRI experiment.
Social Judgments Experiment
The social judgments task was based on a paradigm
devised by Hartwright et al. (2012) and Apperly et al.
(2011). The experiment comprised an orthogonal de-
sign where a protagonistʼs belief state (true [B+] or false
[B−]) and desire state (approach [D+], avoid [D−], or
unspecified [D±]) was systematically manipulated, result-
ing in six equally occurring conditions: B+D+, B+D−,
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B+D±, B−D+, B−D−, B−D±. Immediately before col-
lecting any neuroimaging data, participants were again in-
formed that the task was based on real game playing data
from real individuals and that the participantʼs job was to
predict how these individuals played the game. All par-
ticipants then revisited the interactive training program
used in the prescreen and completed a further practice
block outside the MRI scanner. Note that none of the
practice trials were used in the fMRI experiment.
The fMRI experiment required the participants to
watch and predict which one of two different colored
boxes a character, referred to as “the contestant,” would
open in a virtual game show (Figure 1). A single round
(i.e., trial) of the game show consisted of the contestant
being told what prize was on offer, followed by them
guessing which one of the two boxes contained the prize,
ending in them opening one box. The contestant would
win whatever was in the box they opened; however, one
box was always empty and the other always contained
the prize. If the box contained a prize, they would win
it. If it was empty, they would win nothing and play a
new round.
Each contestant played multiple rounds. The prizes
ranged in desirability, and as the contestant could only
win a finite number of prizes, it was not always in their
interest to play to win every prize. If the contestant liked
the prize on offer, they would open the box where they
guessed the prize was hidden, in the hope of winning
that prize. If they did not like the prize, they would
open the opposite box to where they guessed the prize
was hidden (i.e., the empty box), in the hope of having
another chance to win something more to their liking.
Note, however, that the game show was designed such
that the contestant would only take home a prize in half
of the trials. Furthermore, in half of the “winning” trials,
the contestant would win a prize that they did not actually
want to win.
While the fMRI data were collected, participants watched
a computer-based mock-up of the contestants playing
the afore-described game show. The participantsʼ job was
to predict which box the contestant opened on the basis
of the contestantʼs belief and desire state, in terms of
which of the two boxes the contestant believed contained
the prize, and the contestantʼs desire to win or gamble
and play on for a better prize. Participants were always
told the contestantʼs belief about the location of the
prize and the true location of the prize, but had to
infer the contestantʼs desire to win the prize based on a
color photograph that depicted the contestant smiling
(D+), frowning (D−), or with a neutral (D±) expression.
The training sessions conducted before collecting any
fMRI data taught the participants to treat a smiling face
as signaling the contestantʼs pleasure and, therefore, their
desire to open the box that they thought contained the
prize (approach desire) and a frowning face as signaling
the contestantʼs displeasure and, therefore, their desire to
avoid opening the box that they thought contained the
prize (avoidance desire). Where the contestant was shown
with a neutral expression, participants were asked to con-
sider what sort of person they thought the contestant
was, in terms of what their likes and dislikes might be,
and to select which box they thought the contestant would
open (unspecified desire). Just as with approach/avoid
(D+/D−) trials, in these unspecified desire (D±) trials,
Figure 1. (A) Schematic
example of a single trial. The
left/right presentation of the
red/blue box was randomized.
Where XXX is written for the
prize on offer; this would name
a unique item for each trial,
e.g., The prize on offer: hot
tub. (B) Example statements
for true (B+) and false (B−)
belief scenarios. The temporal
order of these statements was
randomized. (C) From left to
right, example response probe
for approach (D+), avoidance
(D−), unspecified desire
(D±), and filler trials.
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participants were told to select the box that the con-
testant believed contained the prize if they thought the
contestant would have played to win the prize on offer,
or to select the opposite box (i.e., what the contestant
believed to be the empty box) if they thought the contes-
tant would have wanted to avoid winning the prize. Note
that in all cases, participants were told to make their re-
sponses on the basis of the contestantʼs belief state, which
could be either true (B+) or false (B−), therefore re-
quiring them to ignore their own knowledge of the true
location of the prize.
Each block of trials opened with an instruction screen
followed by an initial ISI of 11,600 msec. A single trial
comprised three center-justified statements shown sin-
gularly for 1600 msec and separated by a 500-msec fixation
period, followed by a picture response probe shown for
2500 msec, then a rest period. A variable ISI was used for
rest (range = 9000–14,000 msec, X = 11,500 msec) during
which a small fixation dot was displayed. Each trial lasted
8800 msec, excluding fixation. The experiment comprised
six separate blocks, each of which contained 28 trials and
took 9 min 36 sec to complete.
Each trial opened with a prize statement (e.g., The
prize on offer: designer shoes), followed by either a be-
lief statement (e.g., The contestant thinks the prize is in
the red box) or a reality statement (e.g., The prize is in
the blue box), then the remaining belief or reality state-
ment. The temporal order of belief and reality statements
was randomized but contained an equal number of each
ordering overall. The final statement was followed by
a response probe then rest. Participants were able to
respond from the onset of the response probe, using a
two button box placed in their right hand. Participants
responded by pressing the left button to indicate the
left prize box and the right button to indicate the right
prize box.
Two formats of response probe were used. The format
indicated to the participant what type of response to give.
If a full color photograph of the contestant was shown,
the participant had been trained to indicate which box
they thought the contestant opened, based on the con-
testantʼs belief desire state. These were the trials of inter-
est and made up 75% of the total number of trials. To
ensure that the participants must attend to the contest-
antʼs belief state, regardless of whether it was true or false,
antistrategy trials, termed herein “fillers,” formed 25% of
the presented trials (see Hartwright et al., 2012, for further
discussion). Here, the response probe consisted of a full
color photograph of the contestant, which had been
blurred using a Gaussian smoothing kernel of 10 pixels
FWHM. A black question mark obscured part of the con-
testantʼs face. Participants had been trained to indicate the
true location of the prize when this format of response
probe was shown. These fillers did not form any part of
the analyses presented here.
Images of the contestants were taken from the Radboud
Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). Twenty-eight con-
testantʼs featured in the experiment (all white; 14 men),
where each face was shown on six occasions throughout
the experiment, once per block. Each facial expression—
happy, sad, neutral—was shown twice for each face. Each
image consisted of a head and shoulders shot on a plain
gray background. All contestants were wearing a plain
black t-shirt. Each participant viewed a total of 168 rounds
of the game show, made up of 126 trials of interest and
42 antistrategy fillers, each with a unique prize, presented
over the six blocks.
DATA ACQUISITION
Data were acquired in a single session using a 3T Philips
Achieva scanner, with an eight-channel head coil. Whole-
brain coverage was achieved with the following para-
meters: repetition time = 2.5 sec, echo time = 35 msec,
acquisition matrix = 96 × 96, flip angle = 83°, SENSE
factor = 2. 232 T2*-weighted EPI volumes were obtained
per block of the experiment, each of which consisting
of 42 axial slices obtained consecutively in a bottom–up
sequence, reconstructed voxel size = 3× 3× 3mm3. Four
dummy volumes were acquired at scan time; these were
removed before image reconstruction. Following acquisi-
tion of the functional data, a T1-weighted anatomical im-
age was acquired (3-D TFE, sagittal orientation, repetition
time = 8.4 msec, echo time = 3.8, matrix size 288 × 288,
175 slices, reconstructed voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm3).
During the acquisition of functional data, Presentation
software (v. 14.1; Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA)
was used to display the stimuli and record the behavioral
response data simultaneously.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSIS
The FMRIB software library (FSL version v.5.98; FMRIB,
Oxford, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) was used to perform all
preprocessing and statistical analyses. Preprocessing of
the functional data consisted of slice timing (regular up)
and motion correction (MCFLIRT). High-pass filtering
was conducted on the BOLD signals using a Gaussian
weighted filter of 30 sec. Spatial smoothing was then
applied using a 5-mm FWHM kernel. The functional
data were registered to their respective structural images
and transformed to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) reference brain using a 7-DoF linear transformation
(FLIRT).
The modeling approach replicates the procedure out-
lined in Hartwright et al. (2012), which allows direct com-
parison following the minimal change to our previous
paradigm. Six explanatory variables (EVs) of interest—
B+D+, B+D−, B+D±, B−D+, B−D−, B−D±—were
modeled to reflect the six experimental conditions. The
onset of each EV was time-locked to the button response
and reflected an arbitrary duration of 100 msec. Because
of anticipated differences in RTs as a function of experi-
mental condition, this approach ensured that activation
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reflected the decision-making phase within the experi-
mental sequence. This approach mirrors Hartwright et al.
(2012), which was adopted following careful inspection of
time series data. Each EV was convolved with a gamma-
derived hemodynamic response function within a general
linear model framework. The time series before the onset
of the response probe was modeled as a regressor of no
interest and orthogonalized with respect to the main EVs.
Motion parameters and filler trials were also modeled
as regressors of no interest. Higher- level modeling was
used to aggregate the data across participants within a
mixed effects model using cluster-based thresholding at
voxel Z > 2.5, cluster pcorr < .001. Note that this particular
threshold was applied for ease of comparison with the
earlier published version of this paradigm. This final
whole-brain result reflected a 2 × 3 repeated-measures
ANOVA with Belief (B+/B−) and Desire (D+/D−/D±)
as within-subject factors, plus eight contrasts for direc-
tional tests comparing the levels of each main factor
(B+ > B−, B− > B+, etc.).
CONTRAST MASKING ANALYSIS
To demonstrate voxels that were preferentially active
for each of the three levels within the factor of Desire,
using FSLʼs command line tools (fslmaths), the corrected,
thresholded data from the directional whole-brain analysis
were used as inputs to generate three masks, D+pref,
D−pref, and D±pref. This was done by computing a logical
AND, which collapsed across the pairs of directional con-
trasts for each level (i.e., D+pref = D+ > D− AND
D+> D±; D−pref = D−>D+ AND D−>D±; D±pref =
D± > D+ AND D± > D−). Note that this analysis was
not required for the factor of Belief, as the directional con-
trasts serve this purpose (B+pref = B+ > B−; B−pref =
B− > B+). The mean effect across all conditions was also
computed for significantly active voxels within a bisected
ROI (slices X = −10 through to +10; MNI coordinates).
This enabled identification of voxels that were prefer-
entially active for unspecified desire (D±) versus all other
belief (B+/B−) and desire (D+/D−) conditions within
mPFC.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
All RTs were recorded from the onset of the response
probe. Any incorrect responses were removed for RT
analysis. Note that correct responses are only applicable
in D+/D− trials as D± requires a subjective judgment.
A 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on
the remaining RT data, with Belief (B+/B−) and Desire
(D+/D−/D±) as within-subject factors. This revealed sig-
nificant main effects of Belief, where B−> B+, F(1, 19) =
166.65, p < .001, η2 = 0.90, and Desire, where D± >
D− > D+, F(1, 19) = 99.40, p < .001, η2 = 0.84, and
a significant interaction, F(2, 38) = 4.86, p < .05, η2 =
0.20. Simple effects analyses revealed significant effects
of Belief at each level of the factor of desire, and sig-
nificant effects of Desire at the two levels of the Belief
factor (all ps < .01), however, with the interaction being
accounted for by the effect of Belief being largest when
desires were negative. A further two-way ANOVA was com-
puted on the error data, with Belief (B+/B−) and Desire
(D+/D−) as repeated measures. This identified a main
effect of Belief, where errors B− > B+, F(1, 19) = 6.68,
p < .05, η2 = 0.26, and Desire, where errors D− > D+,
F(1, 19) = 8.35, p < .01, η2 = 0.31. No interaction was
identified, F(1, 19) = 0.20, p = .66, η2 = 0.01. Figure 2
summarizes the mean RT (A) and accuracy data (B).
fMRI Data
Whole-brain Analysis
A 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA identified main effects
of Belief (B+/B−) and Desire (D+/D−/D±) but no in-
teraction between the two factors. Manipulation of an
agentʼs belief state replicated our previously published
findings (Hartwright et al., 2012), yielding regions regularly
implicated in ToM such as bilateral TPJ and precuneus.
Figure 2. Error bars reflect
±1 SEM. (A) Group mean
RT per condition for correct
responses (msec): B+D+ =
923.57; B+D− = 1147.77;
B+D± = 1403.10; B−D+ =
1350.18; B−D− = 1657.81,
B−D± = 1815.55. Error bars
reflect ±1 SEM. (B) Group
mean percentage of errors
across the four conditions
where error data could be
obtained: B+D+ = 0.36%;
B+D− = 1.37%; B−D+ =
2.26%; B−D− = 3.63%.
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Table 1. Factorial Analysis of Belief and Desire
Region Hemi Brodmannʼs area
MNI Coordinates
Z Valuex y z
Main Effect of Belief
Temporoparietal junction R 22 54 −56 26 6.47
Precuneus cortex R 7 2 −66 48 5.76
Orbital frontal cortex L 47 −32 26 −2 5.42
Temporoparietal junction L 40 −52 −52 32 5.41
Insular cortex R 47 46 16 −6 5.22
Middle frontal gyrus R 44 50 20 38 5.18
Paracingulate gyrus L 8 −4 20 48 5.09
Frontal pole R 46 38 52 18 5.03
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis L 45 −48 16 0 4.97
Precuneus cortex L 7 −6 −66 54 4.94
Paracingulate gyrus R 32 2 42 28 4.86
Middle frontal gyrus L 44 −46 14 36 4.80
Insular cortex L 47 −40 16 −6 4.40
Superior frontal gyrus R 9 2 40 42 4.38
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis R 48 52 18 4 4.34
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division L 40 −54 −40 38 4.21
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 39 44 −60 52 4.18
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division R 40 48 −46 42 4.12
Postcentral gyrus L/R 5 0 −54 72 3.52
Superior frontal gyrus L 6 −2 14 68 3.29
Cingulate gyrus, anterior division L 32 −8 40 16 3.16
Main Effect of Desire
Paracingulate gyrus R 8 2 24 48 8.34
Paracingulate gyrus L/R 8 0 28 42 8.15
Occipital pole R 18 22 −98 −2 7.42
Occipital pole L 18 −24 −94 −8 7.16
Superior frontal gyrus L 8 −8 30 58 6.34
Orbital frontal cortex R 47 36 24 −6 5.78
Occipital fusiform gyrus R 18 18 −84 −8 5.66
Intracalcarine cortex R 17 14 −84 2 5.63
Superior frontal gyrus R 8 4 54 40 5.61
Occipital fusiform gyrus L 18 −14 −84 −12 5.59
Middle frontal gyrus R 45 52 28 24 5.57
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division L 19 −22 −86 20 5.56
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis R 48 54 20 6 5.50
Orbital frontal cortex L 47 −38 22 −8 5.29
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Variation of an agentʼs belief state modulated considerable
portions of the frontal cortex, including bilateral dorsolat-
eral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices spanning middle
frontal and inferior frontal gyri, extending to orbital frontal
cortex. This factor also recruited bilateral dorsal medial
frontal regions comprising superior frontal, dorsal anterior
cingulate, and dorsal paracingulate gyri (Table 1; red
shading in Figure 3). Similar to belief reasoning, mani-
pulation of an agentʼs desire state also recruited bilateral
TPJ. However, lateral and medial prefrontal regions were
recruited more extensively; thus, encompassed bilateral
frontal poles on the lateral and medial surface, as well
as rostral medial frontal regions including more ventral
sections of the anterior cingulate and paracingulate gyri.
Unlike the belief condition, variation of an agentʼs desire
state also saw extensive recruitment of occipital regions
spanning bilateral occipital poles to anterior occipital re-
gions such as the calcarine cortex (Table 1; green shading
in Figure 3).
Directional and Contrast Masking Analysis
A series of directional contrasts (Table 2) demonstrated
that bilateral TPJ, superior parietal and occipital cortices,
plus lateral and dorsal medial frontal regions, were typically
more responsive when applying false over true belief rea-
soning to an agent (Figure 4A, B−pref). The only regions
that were preferentially active for true over false belief
reasoning were the left occipital pole and occipital cortex
(Figure 4A, B+pref). For desire-based reasoning, contrast
mask analyses indicated that bilateral occipital cortices
and bilateral pre- and post-central gyri were preferentially
responsive when applying an approach versus avoidance or
unspecified desire (Figure 4B, D+pref). When the agent
expressed an avoidance versus an approach or unspecified
desire, right precuneus was the only region to be preferen-
tially recruited (Figure 4B, D−pref). A large area covering
medial and lateral pFC was highlighted to be most respon-
sive when the agentʼs desire was unspecified versus to ap-
proach or avoid. Medial frontal activation spanned anterior
cingulate, dorsal and rostral medial prefrontal cortices,
extending laterally to bilateral frontal poles (Figure 4B,
D±pref). As shown in Figure 4C, rostral mPFC was prefer-
entially active for unspecified desire over and above all of
the other belief and desire states.
DISCUSSION
The diverse array of social and nonsocial tasks that activate
mPFC has meant that the precise role of this region in ToM
Table 1. (continued )
Region Hemi Brodmannʼs area
MNI Coordinates
Z Valuex y z
Frontal pole R 46 24 56 22 5.07
Cingulate gyrus, anterior division L/R 32 0 44 14 5.01
Temporoparietal junction L 39 −46 −58 44 4.70
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis L 45 −50 20 0 4.43
Temporal pole L 38 −48 16 −10 4.28
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis R 45 54 34 12 4.19
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division R 40 52 −44 48 4.04
Frontal pole L 47 −50 34 −20 4.03
Temporoparietal junction R 22 60 −58 26 3.96
Middle frontal gyrus L 44 −48 16 36 3.92
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division L 40 −42 −38 38 3.88
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division L 40 −42 −44 38 3.88
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis L 45 −52 22 22 3.69
Temporal pole L 38 −40 28 −24 3.62
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 39 54 −62 34 3.54
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division R 2 54 −32 48 3.43
Postcentral gyrus L 40 −32 −36 42 2.59
Regions identified using F-contrasts in a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with factors of Belief (B+/B−) and Desire (D+/D−/D±). Table lists
local maxima for cortical regions, which are modulated by varying belief status (true/false) and desire status (approach/avoid/unspecified) Z > 2.5,
pcorr < .001. All anatomically unique local maxima (with minimum peak separation of 5 mm) are listed. Brodmannʼs areas are approximate.
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has remained vague (Rothmayr et al., 2011). We employed
an analysis of common features of ToM tasks to distinguish
roles that mPFC might serve for representation, control,
and reasoning. The need to represent mental states was
present in all task conditions, whereas the task made it
possible for the first time to manipulate demands on
control and reasoning within a single study. Our results
suggest that dorsal and rostral regions of mPFC play dis-
tinctive roles in ToM control and ToM reasoning, respec-
tively, and that these patterns are consistent with the
proposed functions of these regions in nonsocial tasks.
Conflict Monitoring, Control, and the dmPFC
On the basis of previous behavioral and neuroimaging
work, we expected that greater control would be required
when predicting action based on a false versus true belief,
or a desire to avoid versus approach an object. Behavioral
data from the current study were consistent with these
predictions. The neuroimaging results converge with the
general executive literature in pinpointing dmPFC, com-
prising dorsal ACC and paracingulate gyrus, in supporting
these more cognitively effortful scenarios (Botvinick et al.,
1999, 2004; Bush et al., 2000). Factorial analysis (Table 1,
Figure 3) showed that dmPFC was modulated by manipu-
lating the content of specific ToM states. Investigation of
the directional contrasts (Table 2) highlighted that these
main effects were driven by those mental state concepts
where the greatest need for control existed, such as false
belief, avoidance, and unspecified desire. Notably, the
novel, unspecified desire condition attracted the greatest
increase in response latencies and made greater demands
on dmPFC than both avoidance and approach desire rea-
soning. We suggest that this result is consistent with our
suggestion that dmPFC serves conflict detection in support
of control processes, because to predict the behavior of
the agent with an unspecified desire, participants would
have to withhold any response until they had determined
what they thought the agentʼs preferences might be.
Here, then, conflict exists not only between competing
outcomes, such as the undesirable versus the desirable
outcome, but also potentially between what the participant
would do and what someone like the agent would do in
that particular situation. Taken together, then, these data
are further evidence that dmPFC serves a very general
control function, with more specific functions—such as
inhibition of self-perspective—supported by other neural
regions.
ToM Reasoning and the rmPFC
Also of interest was the role of rmPFC in ToM. Existing
literature, together with the task analysis presented here,
suggests two possible roles for this region, and our task
was designed to distinguish between them. First, the con-
sistency with which rmPFC is recruited for ToM in previous
research has led some authors to suggest that this region
serves the function of representing mental states (Amodio
& Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003, 2006). All conditions
of our current paradigm required representation of the
characterʼs mental states, and so this interpretation of the
role of rmPFC does not predict any variation in activation
across conditions. Second, a growing literature indicates
that thinking beyond the stimuli presented recruits rmPFC
Figure 3. Result from 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA whole-brain analysis with Belief (B+/B−; red) and Desire (D+/D±/D−; green) as
within-subject factors. Yellow areas indicate regions recruited by both factors (B/D). The group data are overlaid on the MNI brain template,
showing significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.5, pcorr < .001. Maps reflect Z-corrected F-statistical images and are displayed in neurological
convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. (A) Activation maps highlighting modulation on the lateral surface. Images
from left to right show left, anterior, right, and posterior views of the cortex respectively. (B) Selected slices highlight modulation in medial
frontal regions. Slices from left to right, x = −10, −6, −2, 2, 6, 10.
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Table 2. Directional Contrasts within the Factors of Belief and Desire
Region Hemi Brodmannʼs area
MNI Coordinates
Z Valuex y z
Belief
B+ > B−
Occipital pole L 18 −20 −94 −10 5.52
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division L 18 −24 −88 18 5.31
Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division L 19 −36 −90 −12 4.02
B− > B+
Temporoparietal junction R 22 50 −50 26 7.18
Precuneus cortex R 7 2 −66 48 5.87
Temporoparietal junction L 40 −52 −52 30 5.76
Insular cortex R 47 44 16 −6 5.63
Frontal orbital cortex L 47 −32 26 −2 5.54
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division L 40 −44 −50 42 5.43
Precuneus cortex L 7 −8 −64 50 5.38
Occipital pole L/R 17 0 −92 −12 5.36
Middle frontal gyrus R 44 50 20 38 5.31
Paracingulate gyrus L 8 −4 20 48 5.21
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis L 48 −54 16 0 5.20
Frontal pole R 46 38 52 18 5.17
Middle frontal gyrus L 9 −50 14 44 5.09
Paracingulate gyrus R 32 2 42 28 5.00
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis L 45 −60 22 8 4.96
Temporal pole L 38 −52 16 −10 4.83
Frontal operculum cortex L 47 −44 18 −4 4.71
Superior frontal gyrus L/R 8 0 22 56 4.57
Superior frontal gyrus R 9 2 40 42 4.53
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis R 48 52 18 4 4.49
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 39 44 −58 40 4.38
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division L 40 −54 −40 38 4.37
Lingual gyrus R 18 4 −84 −16 3.97
Postcentral gyrus L/R 5 0 −54 72 3.70
Desire
D+ > D−
Occipital pole L 18 −22 −94 −8 8.00
Occipital pole R 18 22 −96 −2 7.49
Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division L 19 −36 −90 −12 5.60
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 19 12 −86 44 5.24
Precentral gyrus L 6 −54 −2 46 4.85
Precentral gyrus R 6 50 −8 54 4.48
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Table 2. (continued )
Region Hemi Brodmannʼs area
MNI Coordinates
Z Valuex y z
Postcentral gyrus R 4 4 −36 56 4.26
Superior parietal cortex R 5 20 −50 66 4.17
Postcentral gyrus L 2 −28 −40 66 4.09
D+ > D±
Occipital pole L 18 −20 −96 −6 7.96
Occipital pole R 18 22 −98 0 7.84
Occipital fusiform gyrus R 18 20 −82 −10 6.38
Lingual gyrus R 18 16 −88 −6 6.11
Occipital fusiform gyrus L 18 −14 −84 −12 6.01
Intracalcarine cortex R 17 14 −84 2 6.00
Precentral gyrus L 6 −54 −2 46 5.27
Precentral gyrus R 4 52 −4 38 4.61
Postcentral gyrus R 3 24 −38 76 4.22
Postcentral gyrus L 3 −24 −40 70 4.17
Superior parietal cortex R 5 20 −50 68 4.09
Superior frontal gyrus R 6 16 2 72 3.94
Superior temporal gyrus, anterior division L 21 −56 2 −12 3.53
Planum polare L 38 −58 2 −2 3.52
Central opercular cortex L 48 −50 −2 8 3.25
D− > D+
Paracingulate gyrus R 8 2 24 48 8.06
Superior frontal gyrus R 9 2 40 42 7.17
Superior frontal gyrus L 8 −8 30 46 6.62
Frontal orbital cortex R 47 34 22 −8 6.50
Middle frontal gyrus R 45 52 28 24 6.48
Insular cortex R 47 34 24 0 6.45
Temporoparietal junction R 22 52 −56 26 6.39
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis R 48 54 20 6 6.37
Frontal orbital cortex L 47 −32 24 −8 6.08
Temporoparietal junction L 40 −48 −52 42 5.61
Precuneus cortex R 7 4 −68 42 5.35
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division R 40 52 −46 48 5.34
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division L 40 −46 −44 44 5.27
Precuneus cortex L/R 7 0 −68 54 4.65
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 39 44 −58 50 4.53
Precuneus cortex L 7 −8 −64 50 4.15
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division L 39 −50 −68 44 2.72
D− > D±
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 19 28 −80 24 4.43
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Table 2. (continued )
Region Hemi Brodmannʼs area
MNI Coordinates
Z Valuex y z
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division L 22 −56 −46 10 4.42
Occipital pole R 18 14 −88 22 4.39
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division L 40 −58 −38 32 4.36
Intracalcarine cortex R 17 10 −70 14 4.29
Occipital pole L 18 −18 −96 −2 4.14
Cuneal cortex R 18 4 −84 32 4.11
Precuneus cortex L 7 −4 −58 56 3.94
Superior temporal gyrus, posterior division L 21 −54 −30 −2 3.89
Middle temporal gyrus, posterior division L 21 −58 −24 −8 3.85
Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division L 37 −46 −70 2 3.73
D± > D+
Paracingulate gyrus R 8 2 24 48 8.67
Paracingulate gyrus L/R 8 0 28 42 8.48
Paracingulate gyrus L 32 −4 34 36 8.31
Superior frontal gyrus R 8 4 42 50 7.37
Superior frontal gyrus L 8 −4 28 60 7.11
Insular cortex R 47 36 22 −6 6.17
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division L 39 −46 −60 36 5.63
Temporoparietal junction L 39 −46 −58 42 5.29
Cingulate gyrus, posterior division L 23 −2 −54 24 4.51
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division R 22 60 −60 26 4.48
Temporoparietal junction R 39 50 −58 28 4.37
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division L 40 −46 −50 52 3.83
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division R 2 54 −28 44 3.73
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division L 2 −46 −38 44 3.72
Precuneus cortex R 7 2 −66 34 3.64
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division R 40 50 −44 54 3.52
Cingulate gyrus, posterior division L/R 23 0 −16 28 3.48
Cingulate gyrus, anterior division L/R 23 0 −10 28 3.21
Cingulate gyrus, posterior division L 29 −4 −48 14 2.85
D± > D−
Paracingulate gyrus R 32 2 50 26 5.97
Paracingulate gyrus L/R 32 0 38 34 5.97
Frontal pole L/R 10 0 60 30 5.72
Frontal pole L 9 −16 40 48 5.39
Superior frontal gyrus L 8 −2 38 50 5.08
Table lists local maxima for cortical regions identified using a series of directional t contrasts, where Z> 2.5, pcorr < .001. All anatomically unique local
maxima (with minimum peak separation of 5 mm) are listed. Brodmannʼs areas are approximate.
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even in nonsocial contexts ( Jenkins & Mitchell, 2009;
Gilbert et al., 2007). Thinking beyond the stimuli and, in
particular, so-called “abductive” inference to the best ex-
planation is a frequent requirement of ToM, both in tasks
and outside the laboratory. However, it is not a necessary
feature, and it was not present in the belief factor of the
current task, whereas the desire factor included one level
that required abductive reasoning (D±) and two levels that
only required deductive reasoning (D− and D+).
Consistent with Hartwright et al. (2012), factorial analy-
sis identified that manipulating an agentʼs belief state did
not modulate rmPFC (Table 1, Figure 3). Thus, there was
no difference in how reasoning deductively about an
agent with a true or false belief state was handled by this
region. In contrast to this, manipulation of an agentʼs
desire state was shown to modulate rmPFC. Note that
this was not the case in our previous study, which did
not require abductive reasoning in any condition. Direc-
tional and contrast masking analyses (Table 2, Figure 4)
were used to clarify which of the variations in mentalizing
was driving this effect. rmPFC was shown to respond
preferentially when reasoning about an agent whose de-
sire was unspecified (D±), over and above any of the
other deductive belief and desire conditions (Figure 4C).
Collectively, these data suggest that rmPFC is responsive
to the requirement to reason abductively about mental
states.
These findings converge with Jenkins and Mitchell
(2009), who found that comprehension of a story whose
causal structure was ambiguous or incomplete, rather
than unambiguous and complete, preferentially recruited
mPFC, including rmPFC. Such effects were found irre-
spective of whether the stories required inferences about
a characterʼs mental states, and indeed it is unclear in
this study whether rmPFC was recruited for the ToM
inferences themselves or just for general comprehension
of an ambiguous context. The current study provides
important clarity on this point by showing that rmPFC is
indeed recruited for ToM inferences specifically in cases
where abductive rather than deductive reasoning is
required. In the broader social context, Van Overwalle
(2009) notes that studies that invite richer inferences,
such as trait ascription, recruit mPFC. Relatedly, Quadflieg
et al. (2009) demonstrated that rmPFC is recruited when
reasoning about the type of person (male/female/either)
versus the type of place (indoors/outdoors/either) that is
likely to be associated with an activity, such as mowing
the lawn or watching talk shows. Thus, rmPFC was seen
as an important neural substrate of the access and assigna-
tion of stereotype information. It is important to highlight,
however, that this does not conflict with our assertion
that rmPFC supports a general process that is engaged
when reasoning abductively. A considerable literature dem-
onstrates the automaticity of trait inferences and social
Figure 4. The group data are overlaid on the MNI brain template, showing significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.5, pcorr < .001. Slices from
left to right, x = −10, −6, −2, 2, 6, 10, respectively. Maps reflect Z-corrected t-statistical images. (A) Voxels that are preferentially active during
true versus false belief reasoning (B+pref; cyan); false versus true belief reasoning (B−pref; red). (B) Voxels that are preferentially active during
approach versus unspecified AND avoidance desire (D+pref; blue); avoidance versus approach AND unspecified desire (D−pref; magenta);
unspecified versus approach AND avoidance desire (D±pref; green). (C) Voxels within the medial frontal cortex that are preferentially active
for unspecified desire versus all other belief and desire conditions.
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categorization (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), for example,
on the basis of an image of a face (Todorov, Said, Engell, &
Oosterhof, 2008) or when primed subconsciously (Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996). As such, all of our desire condi-
tions featured the photographs of faces taken from a single
database; our analyses would, therefore, subtract out those
neural regions required for the attribution of stereotype
schemas, as the potential for spontaneous trait ascription,
including the automatic generation of stereotypes, is con-
stant across all conditions. Our unspecified desire condi-
tion, on the other hand, is the only condition to require an
abductive inference on the basis of such ascriptions. When
considered alongside a literature that implicates rmPFC
in autobiographical thinking, for example, in terms of
imagining past or future events versus simply recalling such
occurrences, prospection and the default mode network
(see reviews by Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2009),
the commonality across these, and Jenkins and Mitchell
(2009), is a shared process that reflects the assignation of
information that is obtained through a rich, inferential
process. The present paradigm varied the requirement for
this process, by including a single, abductive reasoning con-
dition alongside matched, a series of deductive reasoning
conditions.
Cognitive versus Affective ToM
Qualitative reviews of the literature suggest a functional
subdivision within mPFC, where a dorsal/rostral boundary
may delineate cognitive versus affective ToM, respectively
(Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Carrington & Bailey,
2009; Lieberman, 2007; Amodio & Frith, 2006). Thus,
belief reasoning would be expected to recruit more dorsal
regions of mPFC, whereas desire reasoning would recruit
rostral regions. While the current data might initially ap-
pear to favor this distinction, we suggest that a simple
cognitive/affective division provides less explanatory
power for our data than the task analysis proposed here.
First, this study suggests that it is likely to be the pro-
cessing requirements within particular ToM concepts that
modulate dmPFC (e.g., true versus false belief ), rather
than the cognitive or affective nature of the ToM concept.
Our data identify that cognitively effortful situations in-
volving false belief, avoidance, or unspecified desire
reasoning make greater demands on dmPFC than less
effortful ToM situations such as true belief or approach
desire. We suggest that this effort, seen in increased
response latencies and errors, is a reflection of increased
conflict between alternative predictions for the agent.
Thus, increased effort is associated with increased demand
on dmPFC, regardless of the type of mental state being
represented.
Second, while only our affective (desire) condition
recruited rmPFC, this region was preferentially engaged
as a function of the reasoning demands within this con-
dition, rather than the mere requirement to infer desires.
Specifically, a context that required abductive inference
about desire was associated with increased demand on
rmPFC, compared with conditions that only required
deductive inferences about desire. Our data show that
rmPFC is brought in to serve context-specific reason-
ing processes, such as when mentalizing beyond the
information presented is required.
Representing Mental States
By definition, ToM requires people to hold in mind re-
presentations of mental states, and questions about this
representational aspect of ToM have dominated thinking
in the developmental, cognitive, comparative, and neuro-
science literatures (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Saxe & Powell,
2006; Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1987). However, identification
of the neural basis of such representations has proved a
surprisingly elusive target, with ongoing debates about
the relative specificity of mPFC versus TPJ for such rep-
resentations (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Scholz et al., 2009;
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe &
Wexler, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). This study was
not designed as a strong test of the neural correlates of
representing mental states, as we did not include condi-
tions without mental states for comparison. However,
the current findings do add to a growing body of evidence,
suggesting that the mere representation of mental states
is only part of the neurocognitive basis of ToM, in two
important ways. First, other functional processes for cog-
nitive control and reasoning are integral to ToM and re-
cruit neural regions supporting these processes in ways
that can be predicted from functional analysis of ToM
tasks. Second, even if a consensus does emerge on neural
regions that are involved in representing mental states,
it seems unlikely that this function will be sufficient to
explain patterns of activity in those neural regions during
ToM tasks. In this study, mental states needed to be repre-
sented in all conditions, and yet we observed condition-
wise variation in activity in the neural regions most often
suggested to be the neural basis of representing mental
states (rmPFC and bilateral TPJ). Such variation can be
understood by appeal to other functional aspects of
ToM, such as the need for cognitive control, and the need
for different kinds of reasoning. We suggest that this
makes vivid the suggestion that ToM is subserved by a net-
work, which may be comprised of distinct functional and
anatomical components, but whose activity can only be
understood by considering the network as a whole and
the tasks in which it is engaged.
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